The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in the Western Countries. Joakim Palme and Walter Korpi () No 174, LIS Working papers from LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg

the Paradox of Redistribution: The more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce

the paradox of redistribution The social insurance models outlined here developed over a century of conflicts among different interest groups concerning the dis- tribution of people's worldly goods. The reason for this paradox of redistribution, as shown in the table above, is that while taxes usually are relative (a fixed percentage of income for example), benefits or services are usually nominal. The extent of redistribution depends, in other words, not just on accuracy of aim but also on the sums transferred (Korpi and Palme 1998). Start studying Poverty and Social Exclusion Concepts: Korpi, W. & Palme, J. (1998) 'The paradox of redistribution & strategies of equality'.

Paradox of redistribution

There is a paradox of redistribution. In this paper, the paradox of redistribution is translated to system dynamics and the coherence of the theory is analyzed by a system dynamics model. The system dynamics translation results in a model that reproduces the reference modes. Rethinking the paradox of redistribution 2 should do about the less well-adjusted minority, and benefits are susceptible to retrenchment on the grounds of ‘fairness’ (Rothstein, 1998: 158). In voting bodies, when voting weights are reallocated, it may be observed that the voting power of some members, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices, increases while their voting weight decreases. By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a “paradox of redistribution” can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently

Taeko Hiroi. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2019, vol. 49, issue 4, 642-670 Abstract: This article examines the relationship I replicate the study by Oliver Jacques and Alain Noel on the Paradox of Redistribution in order to ascertain the role of universalism in the 21 st century.

Donors differ in the amount of official development assistance dedicated to poverty reduction. We investigate the causes of variation over time and donors by employing both a regression approach with aggregate data on bilateral aid and two short

ALESINA AND ANGELETOS: FAIRNESS AND REDISTRIBUTION Corruption and the 'Paradox of Redistribution'. Social Indicators.

We argue that social insurance institutions are of central importance for redistributive outcomes. using new data bases, our comparative analyses of the effects of different institutional types of welfare states on poverty and inequality indicate that institutional differences lead to unexpected outcomes and generate the paradox of redistribution: The more we target benefits at the poor and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we

Korpi, W., Palme, J. (1998).

revised The reason for this paradox of redistribution, as shown in the table above, is that while taxes usually are relative (a fixed percentage of income for example), types of welfare states on poverty and inequality indicate that institutional differences lead to unexpected outcomes and generate the paradox of redistribution: Debates on how to reduce poverty and inequality have focused on two con- troversial questions: Should social policies be targeted to low-income groups.
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Rethinking the paradox of redistribution 2 should do about the less well-adjusted minority, and benefits are susceptible to retrenchment on the grounds of ‘fairness’ (Rothstein, 1998: 158).

They present and support a politically important and rather counterintuitive argument: the more social benefits are targeted to the poor, Taeko Hiroi, 2019. "Paradox of Redistribution: Legislative Overrepresentation and Regional Development in Brazil," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 642-670.
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Feb 4, 2013 Barry Schwartz, who in 2005 suggested wealth redistribution as a remedy for choice overload, is tells us in 2010, basically, that he was not

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2019, vol. 49, issue 4, 642-670 Abstract: This article examines the relationship I replicate the study by Oliver Jacques and Alain Noel on the Paradox of Redistribution in order to ascertain the role of universalism in the 21 st century. Through my findings and a comprehensive review of history, literature, and exogenous factors, I am able to support the conclusion of Jacques and Noel that the Paradox still exists in the modern welfare state and how it relates to universalism. 2. The story so far: the paradox of redistribution ‘The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in the Western Countries’, an influential article by Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme published in the American Sociological Review (ASR) in 1998 marked a Welfare services and the Paradox of Redistribution.

There is a paradox of redistribution. In this paper, the paradox of redistribution is translated to system dynamics and the coherence of the theory is analyzed by a system dynamics model. The system dynamics translation results in a model that reproduces the reference modes.

In voting bodies, when voting weights are reallocated, it may be observed that the voting power of some members, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices, increases while their voting weight decreases. By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a “paradox of redistribution” can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently design. The Paradox of Redistribution is an argument about distributive politics.

and wealth redistribution, but my analyses are of citizens' beliefs and Democracy, redistribution and inequality (No. w19746). National Bureau of Economic Research.